╨╧рб▒с>■  +-■   *                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                ье┴#` ЁR┐Ф bjbjбб2├├Ф      дjjjjjjj~FFFF R ~ ЄjjjjjjjjЫЭЭЭЭЭЭ$ hv 6┴jWjjWW┴jjjj╓╗╗╗W.jjjjЫ╗WЫ╗╗jj╗j^ 0SЁE╚FЕ ╗Ыь0 ╗м П"м ╗╗─м jj"М╗д╕Яjjj┴┴▒ jjj WWWW~~~фbф~~~b~~~jjjjjj     Incentives for non-price discrimination Irina Kondaurova and Dennis L. WeismanAbstractA regulated upstream monopolist supplies an essential input to firms in a downstream market. Non-price discrimination or sabotage becomes a concern when the upstream monopolist vertically integrates downstream. This article develops a simulation algorithm to determine the likelihood that discrimination will arise in equilibrium using data from the US long-distance market. Based on 1000 random draws of own and cross-price elasticities, the simulations reveal that discrimination arises in 934 cases at current access charges. This analysis has implications for regulatory policy, including access charge reform and entry by the Regional Bell Operating Companies into the interLATA long distance market. Author Keywords: Access pricing; Vertical integration; Discrimination; Regulation JEL classification codes: L51; L96 )PY - o И У Ф №ї█╞о╞о╞й h╡r╣o(/h╡r╣h╡r╣5БB*CJKHOJQJ\Б^Jph)h╡r╣h╡r╣B*CJKHOJQJ^Jph3h╡r╣h╡r╣5БB*CJKHOJQJ\Б^JaJph h╡r╣5Б\Бh╡r╣ )PY o У Ф ··х╥╥╥╨$dhдdдd1$[$\$a$gd╡r╣$dhдdдd1$@&[$\$a$gd╡r╣gd╡r╣Ф ¤01Р82P░В. ░╞A!░"░#Ра$Ра%░░╨░╨ Р╨ЖЬN@ё N ckЗe $1$a$$CJKHPJ_HaJmH nHsH tHf`2f ╡r╣hШШ 3$дdдd1$@&[$\$a$'5БB*CJKHOJQJ\Б^JaJph$A@Є б$ ╪ЮдЛ╡k=ДW[SOBi@є │B nfРhИ